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Abstract. In this introduction, we briefly overview the topics covered by the 
contributions included in this special issue which, from different angles, 
deal with the organization and governance of social economy enterprises. 
Three different approaches are taken by the contributions to the special 
issue: one is theoretical, another is empirical and the last one is a case-
based, qualitative perspective.  
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1	 Some of the works included in this special issue were presented at the Conference 
on Social and Cooperative Economy held in Santander in September 2014 
organized by CIRIEC Espana, at the Research Conferences on Social Economy held 
in Antwerp in October 2013 and in Lisbon in July 2015 organized by CIRIEC 
International and at the two meetings organized by the CIRIEC Scientific 
Commission Working Group ‘Organization and Governance in Social Economy 
Enterprises’: the first in Rome in June 2014 and the second in Namur in December 
2014. We would like to thank all Working Group members for their constructive 
effort and active participation. We are further grateful to the numerous reviewers 
who helped to significantly increase the quality of the papers.  
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The aim of the special issue is to improve our understanding of existing 
governance arrangements which are commonly adopted in social economy 
enterprises such as cooperatives, mutual organizations, social businesses, or 
charities. Among the many topics which might be studied in this context are 
questions related to strategic stakeholder management, inter- and intra-firm 
alliances, social enterprises’ organizational governance and hierarchical 
structures, and manager and member compensation (e.g. Jegers 2009, 
Nilsson 2001). In particular, to what extent are social enterprises more or 
less prone than profit-maximizing firms to pay variable compensation 
schemes to their man- agers and members and prefer to rely on fixed wages 
and other more intrinsic forms of incentives? Why do social economy 
enterprises prefer to adopt horizontal and democratic forms of organizations 
rather than vertical and hierarchical organizational structures? Can we shed 
light on their natural tendency to be embedded into informal networks of 
relationships rather than into hierarchical and formal structures?  
Recent work has shown, for example, that socially concerned enterprises, 
firms that pursue non-profit motives, and other hybrid organizational forms 
are used to deal with their managers in quite a different way from their 
profit-maximizing rivals (e.g. Cai et al. 2011, Frye et al. 2006, Mahoney and 
Thorn 2005, 2006, Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009, Deckop et al. 2006). 
The literature on the corporate governance of cooperatives has quite 
intensively discussed the relations between members of social enterprises, 
their board of directors and managers (see e.g. Richards et al. 1998, Nilsson 
2001, Sykuta and Cook 2001, Cornforth 2004, Spear 2004). Moreover, 
focusing on incentives and performance measurement, existing empirical 
work has  repeatedly shown that social economy enterprises – in contrast to 
profit-maximizing firms – avoid providing high-powered incentives to their 
managers and rely to a much higher extent on peer monitoring, implicit 
contracts (enforced by social ties between CEOs and board members) 
and subjective performance evaluation (see, for instance, Ittner et al. 
2007).  
The empirical findings for socially responsible firms and cooperatives 
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are in line with the findings for (other) non-profit organizations, see e.g. 
Hallock (2002), Brandl and Guttel (2007), and Frumkin and Keating 
(2010). To understand these observations, two main reasons have been 
advanced. First, from an agency perspective, using low-powered 
incentives for the managers in social economy enterprises is the board’s 
optimal response since the objectives are difficult to quantify (Preyra 
and Pink 200, Hallock 2002). In non-profit organizations the goals are 
vague and ill-defined and the danger of giving dysfunctional incentives 
is high (Theuvsen 2004, Spear 2004). Additionally, in social economy 
enterprises the heterogeneity across members makes it difficult to agree 
on performance targets, which results in low-powered incentives for 
CEOs (Hueth and Marcoul 2009). Moroever, strong extrinsic financial 
incentives are against the principle of fairness and might crowd out 
intrinsic motivation of individuals who have (been) selected to work in 
a social economy enterprise (Spear 2004, Theuvsen 2004). Finally, the 
product market competition and the strategic interactions between 
firms, can also play a role in shaping incentive contracts and 
governance. In the last years, several empirical papers have shown that 
the interplay between the strategic interaction between firms and the 
internal organization plays an important role (e.g. Cunat and Guadalupe 
2005, Karuna 2007, Vroom and Gimeno 2007).  
The contributions included in this special issue take three different 
perspectives.  
(1) A theoretical perspective, mainly aimed at formally disentangling 
the different behaviors of social enterprises under imperfect 
competition in mixed markets or facing the issue to raise sufficient 
venture capital.  
(2) An empirical perspective, mainly having the purpose to check 
whether the behavior of nonprofits and cooperatives as predicted by 
theory can be confirmed by the empirical data.  
(3) A case-based, qualitative perspective, analyzing in detail the 
behavior of individual or small groups of particular social enterprises 
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in their day-to-day operations. Three papers take the theory perspective.  
Patrick Herbst and Jens Prufer compare the efficiency of firms in a 
market in which they can provide products of different qualities. The 
authors show that in equilibrium for-profit firms provide the lowest 
quality level, cooperatives provide an intermediate level and non-profit 
organizations the highest one among them. The efficiency of these 
different organizational forms, though, ultimately depends on the cost 
of production and the cost of collective decision making. It is shown 
that for high cost of collective decision making, a profit- maximizing 
firm is usually the most efficient form. Yet, for lower levels of these 
costs, profit- maximizing firms are increasingly dominated by either 
nonprofits or cooperatives (depending on the incremental cost of 
quality production). As the level of competition increases, the 
efficiency of profit-maximizing firms improves vis-à-vis nonprofits and 
cooperatives and, thus, may drive organizational change.  
Alessandro Fedele and Sara Depedri study the role of social enterprises 
in a mixed market where they compete against profit-maximizing firms. 
To understand how access to social services and welfare are affected, 
they consider a differentiated-products duopoly model of the Hotelling 
type and assume that social enterprises maximize surplus of consumers. 
Compared to a market economy where only profit-maximizing firms 
compete, in a mixed economy public policy might face a trade-off 
between access and welfare.  
Kazuhiko Mikami explores the economic and legal implications of 
transferable shares in a cooperative as compared with the usual 
adoption of stock-equity in a traditional capitalist firm. He shows that, 
with transferable shares, a cooperative firm becomes isomorphic to a 
capitalist firm while maintaining its essential characteristics of being 
owned by the members as input providers or output customers, and not 
by ‘capitalists’. Based on this starting point, the author explores the 
possibility for a government of developing a unified business law that 
regulates both capitalist and cooperative firms within a single legal 
framework.  
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The empirical perspective is taken by Joaquim Rubens Fontes Filho 
and Michelle Bronstein who compare the governance practices adopted 
by a sample of Brazilian companies listed on the stock-exchange and of 
non-profit organizations. To compare governance solutions, the author 
introduce a framework based on five categories, or building blocks, 
existing in every governance system and addressed in different 
governance codes. All information was collected from non- profits’ by-
laws and companies’ official documents. This comparison helps to 
identify a few major differences as well as similarities between 
governance practices of the two types of firms, as a more accentuate 
internal participation and democracy, less monitoring, low managers’ 
turn- over, more diverse shareholder groups and lower salaries for 
managers in non-profits than in for- profit firms.  
Derek C. Jones, Iiro Jussila and Panu Kalmi use panel data of Finish 
cooperative banks to study in detail the determinants of membership. 
Using a rational choice framework, they argue that both economic and 
associational motives might explain the decision to join the cooperative. 
Among other reasons, they find that the most prominent ones are 
monetary incentives and the size of the community from which 
members are recruited from.  
A case-based perspective is adopted by Anjel Errasti, Baleren Bakaikoa 
and Enekoitz Etxezarreta who investigate the challenges that 
cooperatives face as they trans- form into multinational enterprises. As 
a case they focus on Mondragon cooperatives and provide a qualitative, 
interview-based study on the economic and organizational problems 
alternative organizations might encounter as they become 
internationally active. Like in the case of Fagor (the Basque domestic 
appliance company), these problems might eventually lead to 
bankruptcy.  
Simon Berge, Wayne Caldwell and Phil Mount use a qualitative study 
based on semi-structured interviews to gain insights into the 
governance of nine food cooperatives in Ontario, Canada. Based on 
responses of managers of the cooperatives, they argue that the theory of 
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cyclical board behavior provides new insights into the evolution of a 
cooperatives’ board of directors. Specifically, being aware of the 
current phase in which the cooperative’s board is in can actually help 
the management to adapt the role and composition of the board.  
Finally, Yena Lee, Yunhwan Nam and Sanghoon Lee conduct focus 
group and in-depth interviews within a group of cooperatives self-
organized in secondary associations in a district of Seoul, South Korea. 
Their study analyses the characteristics of these organizations and 
proposes possible models and strategies for cooperation. In particular, 
the authors explore whether secondary organizations can, and in which 
way, boost the collaboration among cooperatives. Based on these 
interviews, the authors drew a conceptual model and a few specific 
strategies to enhance cooperation.  
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